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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Monetary and Non-monetary Incentives 
Contract theory has traditionally focused on the design of monetary incentives as the unique 
motivation tool. The premise of these theories, also known as the principal-agent paradigm, is that 
workers will only respond to monetary incentives (e.g. piece rates, bonuses, stock options) leaving 
aside the role of intrinsic motivators (see Laffont and Martimort, 2002 and Bolton and 
Dewatripont, 2005 for reviews). These theories commend a widespread use of monetary incentives 
rewarding workers according to observable measures of effort. The predictions of these models, 
however, are frequently at odds with observed labor contracts. One of the major puzzles for this 
literature is to account for the rather limited use of monetary incentives in the workplace. For 
example, Chiappori and Salanié (2000) report extensive evidence that pay is much less sensitive 
to firm performance than what standard theories predict. 
In this paper, we put forward that this discrepancy between theory and evidence may result 
from principal-agent models neglecting important aspects of work motivation related to the use of 
non-monetary incentives. Psychologists and behavioral economists (Deci 1971, 1975; Frey and 
Jegen, 2001) have already challenged the idea that workers’ motivation relies exclusively on 
monetary incentives. For example, self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Ryan and 
Deci, 2000) posits a continuum of motivational states ranging from extrinsic motivation, in which 
people are motivated by external factors, to intrinsic motivation, in which their behavior is 
completely self-determined. In the workplace, intrinsic motivation is associated with high levels 
of employee satisfaction, commitment, and wellbeing (e.g., Baard et al. 2004; Deci et al. 2001). 
Self-determination theory suggests that intrinsic motives may alleviate the conflict of interest 
between workers who supposedly dislike effort and employers who aim at maximizing firm 
performance. This theory also explains why higher extrinsic incentives (e.g. monetary incentives 
or managerial control) may undermine workers’ internal drives (see Gneezy et al. 2011 and 
Kamenica, 2012 for reviews).  
Even though a growing number of works in Economics have documented the effectiveness of 
various forms of non-monetary incentives such as goals (Wu et al. 2008; Goerg and Kube, 2012; 
Gómez-Miñambres, 2012; Corgnet et al. 2015a; Dalton et al. 2015; van Lent and Souverijny, 2015; 
Allen et al. 2016), status incentives (Charness et al. 2014), symbolic rewards (Kosfeld and 
Neckermann, 2011), delegation (Fehr et al. 2013), autonomy (Falk and Kosfeld, 2006) or trust 
(Dickinson and Villeval, 2008), little is known about the interaction between monetary and non-
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monetary incentives. It is essential, however, to examine monetary and non-monetary incentives 
jointly to provide guidance for practitioners who typically use both types of incentives.  
1.2. Contract Design and Non-monetary Incentives  
Our approach aims at incorporating non-monetary incentives in the principal-agent framework 
by relying on the widespread and extensively-studied practice of “goal setting”. The motivational 
effect of wage-irrelevant goals has been studied at length in the literature in Psychology and 
Management (see Locke, 1996 and Locke and Latham, 2002 for reviews) and more recently in the 
Economics literature (Wu et al. 2008; Goerg and Kube, 2012; Gómez-Miñambres, 2012; Corgnet 
et al. 2015a). According to Locke and Latham (2002) 90% of the studies show a positive 
correlation between the use of goal setting in firms and workers performance. The literature has, 
however, paid little attention to the study of the relationship between wage-irrelevant goals and 
monetary incentives which seems essential to both incentive theorists and practitioners.  
Corgnet et al. (2015a) took a first step in that direction by studying the interaction between 
monetary stakes and goal setting policies. They showed that goals tend to be more effective when 
stakes are large than when they are small. The present work goes one step further by studying the 
design of contracts that include both monetary incentives and wage-irrelevant goals.  
From a theoretical standpoint, we modify the standard principal-agent model with moral hazard 
(e.g. Holmström, 1979) by assuming that the agent has two sources of work motivation: a standard 
monetary motivation and a goal-dependent non-monetary motivation. As a result, workers’ utility 
not only increases when pay is high but also when goals are achieved. Extending on Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) we assume that agents are loss averse in the non-monetary domain. In our 
model, this implies that the utility loss of falling short of the goal by a certain amount is higher 
than the utility gain of producing more than the goal by the same amount. Our theoretical 
contribution is to extend the principal-agent model to a case in which principals can set both 
monetary (a fixed pay and a performance pay) and non-monetary incentives (wage-irrelevant 
goals). We show that goal setting, by providing an additional tool to incentivize agents, allows 
principals to achieve stronger incentives while making lesser use of performance pay. One caveat 
with the use of goal setting is that agents will suffer a utility loss if they do not attain the goal set 
by the principal. To compensate for that possibility, the principal will increase the agent’s fixed 
pay when setting goals to agents. Therefore, goal setting generates a tradeoff between lowering 
performance pay and increasing fixed pay to ensure agents’ participation. The optimal contract is 
such that the decrease in performance pay made possible by the use of wage-irrelevant goals more 
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than compensates the necessary increase in fixed pay, thus reducing the principal’s agency costs 
to motivate agents. Therefore, agents will exert more effort and principals will obtain higher 
earnings when goal setting is present in the model. In the presence of goal setting, the principal 
will thus be able to reduce the wage bill by substituting costly monetary incentives with non-
monetary incentives. 
In our setting, optimal contracts typically rely both on performance pay and wage-irrelevant 
goals. Our framework contrasts with models in which monetary incentives may undermine 
intrinsic motivation. For example, Bénabou and Tirole (2003) stress the possibly negative effect 
of monetary incentives on agents’ intrinsic motivation in a setting in which an informed principal 
holds private information about the agent’s ability level. In their model, the crowding out of 
intrinsic motivation arises because setting strong monetary incentives provides a negative signal 
on the agent’s ability level which, in turn, may lead the agent to exert low effort. By contrast, our 
model considers the commonly-studied case in which agents (not principals) hold private 
information about their level of ability. In that case, performance pay does not signal low-ability 
to the agent and thus does not undermine motivation.   
We test our model conjectures using a controlled experimental environment in which we 
recreate the essence of a principal-agent model with goal setting. We isolate the effect of non-
monetary incentives (goal setting) by comparing contract design and organizational production in 
two separate environments: one in which goal setting is available to the principal and one in which 
it is not. To that end, we use a virtual workplace that reproduces features of existing organizations 
such as real-effort tasks and on-the-job leisure (Internet browsing) (Corgnet et al. 2015a). This 
real-effort and real-leisure work environment has been shown to be suited for the study of labor 
incentives in the laboratory (Corgnet et al. 2015b, 2015c, 2015d). In our setting, the principal 
selects a wage-irrelevant goal in addition to monetary incentives which include both a fixed pay 
and a performance pay, where performance pay states the share of total output assigned to the 
agent as in standard linear incentive contracts. The agent then decides whether to accept or reject 
the principal’s offer. In line with our theoretical conjectures, we show that goals were effectively 
used by principals to motivate agents. Principals decided to set a goal in 84.5% of the cases in 
which they were allowed to do so, in addition to setting monetary incentives. We confirm the 
prediction of our theoretical model regarding compensation contracts by showing that principals 
set weaker monetary incentives in the presence of goals than in their absence. In particular, 
performance (fixed) pay for the contracts accepted by the agent was on average equal to 40.4% 
4 
 
(104.9¢) of total output in the presence of goals compared to 45.1% (98.7¢) in the absence of goals. 
Despite weaker incentives and in line with our model predictions, agents worked significantly 
more (28.1% more) in the presence of goals than in their absence. Consistently, principals earned 
17.3% more in the experimental design in which they were allowed to set goals.  
1.3. Related Literature on Contract Design with Reference-dependent Utility Functions 
The specification of our goal setting model is motivated by the experimental evidence in Heath 
et al. (1999) showing that goals serve as reference points consistently with prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Our approach thus relates to the works studying optimal 
contracting in the presence of prospect theory preferences. In the Finance literature, Dittman et al. 
(2010) analyze optimal executive compensation contracts when CEOs are loss averse. The authors 
consider a typical CEO compensation contract with fixed wages, stocks and options. Stocks are 
riskier than options but provide stronger incentives because they are more tightly linked to the 
actual value of the firm. They show that in a standard principal-agent model without loss aversion 
the incentive effect dominates the risk-tolerance effect so that the optimal contract should only 
involve stocks, a result which is inconsistent with observed CEO contracts. The authors also show 
that their principal-agent model can be reconciled with empirical evidence when assuming that 
CEOs are loss averse. In that case, options become part and parcel of the optimal contract because 
they provide insurance to CEOs against losses in case of bad luck. Relatedly, de Meza and Webb 
(2007) argue that compensation contracts including bonuses may be optimal when agents are loss 
averse with respect to a reference wage. The authors consider the reference point to be either 
exogenous or given by the median of possible wages. Herweg et al. (2010) consider a principal-
agent model where the reference wage of the agent is determined by rational expectations 
following Kőszegi and Rabin (2006). The results in Herweg et al. (2010) are consistent with de 
Meza and Webb (2007) as they show that bonus contracts are likely to be optimal when agents are 
loss averse. In line with previous research, our model considers a principal-agent framework in 
which the agent’s utility function is reference dependent. Unlike previous papers, however, we 
study optimal contract setting in an environment in which principals set both monetary and non-
monetary incentives (wage-irrelevant goals). In our setting, goals act as reference points for agents’ 
intrinsic motivation. We thus focus on the case in which agents are loss averse in the non-monetary 
domain rather than in the monetary domain.  
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The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our theoretical framework. Section 
3 describes the experimental environment, procedures and hypotheses. Main results are exposed 
in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this section, we develop a principal-agent model in which wage-irrelevant goals act as 
reference points for the agent. This model will help us derive a set of conjectures which will be 
tested using experiments. 
2.1. The Model 
We consider a binary effort principal-agent model with moral hazard à la Laffont and 
Martimort (2002). There are two types of agents indexed by 𝑖 ∈ {𝑙, ℎ} where 𝑙 stands for low ability 
and ℎ stands for high ability. The principal does not observe the level of ability of the agent but 
knows the proportion (𝜃) of high-ability agents in the population. Effort is denoted by 𝑒𝑖 ∈ {0,1}. 
Exerting effort implies a cost 𝑐(𝑒), where the cost of effort is normalized as follows: 𝑐(0) = 0 and 
𝑐(1) = 𝑐. Production (𝑦) is stochastic and can take three values {𝑦0, 𝑦𝐿 , 𝑦𝐻} where 𝑦𝐻 > 𝑦𝐿 >
𝑦0 = 0. High-ability agents can produce {𝑦𝐿 , 𝑦𝐻} while low-ability agents can produce {0, 𝑦𝐿}. 
Effort affects production following first order stochastic dominance so that 𝑃𝑟(𝑦 = 𝑦𝐿|𝑒𝑙 = 0) =
𝑃𝑟(𝑦 = 𝑦𝐻|𝑒ℎ = 0) = 𝜋0, and 𝑃𝑟(𝑦 = 𝑦𝐿|𝑒𝑙 = 1) = 𝑃𝑟(𝑦 = 𝑦𝐻|𝑒ℎ = 1) = 𝜋1, with Δ𝜋: =
𝜋1 − 𝜋0 > 0. 
The agent is paid a wage (𝑤) from the principal according to a linear contract 𝑤 ≔ 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑦, 
where 𝛼 represents fixed pay and 𝛽 ∈ [0,1] represents performance pay. We assume that 𝛼 cannot 
be negative, so that the principal cannot “sell the firm” to the agent. This restriction implies limited 
liability of the agent. 
The agent derives monetary utility, 𝑢(⋅), as well as non-monetary utility, 𝑣(⋅),  which is 
obtained from attaining wage-irrelevant goals set by the principal. We assume that the agent’s 
monetary utility function is 𝑢(𝑤) = 𝑤. We define the agent’s non-monetary utility as a reference-
dependent function where the reference point is assumed to be a wage-irrelevant goal (𝑔) which 
is set by the principal when proposing the contract to the agent. Our specification is motivated by 
lab and field evidence (Heath et al. 1999 and Allen et al. 2016) showing that wage-irrelevant goals 
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serve as reference points in a manner which is consistent with prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979).2 
More specifically, the non-monetary utility function, for a particular goal (𝑔), is given by 
𝑣(𝑦 − 𝑔), where 𝑣(⋅) has the following properties: 
(i) 𝑣(0) = 0  (goal as reference point); 
(ii) 𝑣′(⋅) > 0 (increasing in production given a goal); 
(iii) For all 𝑥 > 0, −𝑣(−𝑥) = 𝜆𝑣(𝑥) where 𝜆 > 1  (goal-induced loss aversion); 
(iv) 𝑣′′(𝑥) > 0 for all 𝑥 < 0 (convexity for goal-induced losses), and; 
(v) 𝑣′′(𝑥) < 0 for all 𝑥 > 0 (concavity for goal-induced gains). 
For convenience, we will denote 𝑣𝑗,𝑔: = 𝑣(𝑦𝑗 − 𝑔) and Δ𝑣𝑗𝑘,𝑔: = 𝑣(𝑦𝑗 − 𝑔) − 𝑣(𝑦𝑘 − 𝑔) for 
𝑗, 𝑘 ∈ {0, 𝐿, 𝐻}. We denote by 𝑈(𝑤, 𝑦, 𝑒𝑖, 𝑔) the sum of monetary and non-monetary utility minus 
the cost of effort: 
𝑈(𝑤, 𝑦, 𝑒𝑖, 𝑔) ≔ 𝑤 + 𝑣(𝑦 − 𝑔) − 𝑐(𝑒𝑖) 
Principals are assumed to be risk neutral thus maximizing expected profits which are defined 
as the difference between the agent’s expected production and the agent expected wage. The 
principal’s problem is thus to choose monetary incentives and goals that maximize expected profits 
subject to incentive compatibility and participation constraints. For the sake of illustration we will 
focus our attention on contracts that induce both low- and high- ability agents to exert effort.3 
2.2. Goal Setting and Monetary Incentives: The Optimal Labor Contract 
In Proposition 1 we characterize the optimal labor contract when principals set both monetary 
incentives {𝛼, 𝛽} and non-monetary incentives (𝑔). Since the optimal labor contract is affected by 
the goal (𝑔) we refer to the optimal fixed pay for a given goal as 𝛼𝑔
∗  and the optimal performance 
pay for a given goal as 𝛽𝑔
∗. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 This specification was also used in theoretical works such as Wu et al. (2008) who studied workers’ response to 
exogenously given goals in the absence of monetary incentives. 
3 Similar findings hold when considering the case in which principals induce only one type of agent to exert effort. 
Further details are available upon request from the authors. 
7 
 
Proposition 1 (Optimal contract with goal setting) 
The optimal contract for a given goal is such that: 
𝛼𝑔
∗ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {−𝑐
𝜋0
∆𝜋
− 𝜋1(∆𝑣𝐿0,𝑔 − ∆𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝑔) − 𝑣0𝑔, 0} 
𝛽𝑔
∗ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {
1
y𝐻 − y𝐿
[
𝑐
Δ𝜋
− Δ𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝑔] , 0} 
And the optimal goal is such that: 
𝑔∗ ∈ (0, 𝑦𝐻) 
 
The principal uses performance pay to reward the agent when output is high. Performance pay 
(𝛽𝑔
∗) increases with the cost of effort and decreases with Δ𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝑔 that represents the agent’s goal-
dependent utility of achieving a high output relative to a low output. Note that if this goal-
dependent non-monetary payoff is sufficiently high with respect to the cost of effort the principal 
will not need to provide any monetary incentives (𝛽𝑔
∗ = 0) to motivate the agent. The fixed pay 
(𝛼𝑔
∗) is set so that the agent accepts the labor contract. Finally, the optimal goal (𝑔∗) is positive 
and always attainable by the high-ability agent. 
In the following corollary we study the relationship between fixed pay, performance pay and 
goals in the optimal labor contract. 
Corollary 1 (Monetary incentives and goals) 
𝑑𝛼𝑔
∗
𝑑𝑔
≥ 0 ;    
𝑑𝛽𝑔
∗
𝑑𝑔
≤ 0 
Corollary 1 captures an important effect of wage-irrelevant goals on the compensation contract. 
It shows that an increase in the goal set by the principal leads to an increase in fixed pay and a 
decrease in performance pay. In other words, goal setting makes the optimal contract less sensitive 
to changes in performance.  
The intuition behind Corollary 1 follows from the fact that goals provide non-monetary 
incentives that can be used to substitute monetary incentives thus dampening the weight of 
performance pay in the labor contract. By setting appropriate goals which are less likely to be 
attained with low effort the principal can increase the non-monetary costs of shirking. Doing so, 
the principal will be able to decrease performance pay while still motivating the agent to work. 
Technically, the principal can choose goals that maximize Δ𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝑔 thus making the agent’s 
incentive compatibility constraint slacker so that performance pay can be lowered while still 
motivating the agent to exert effort. However, using goals to motivate the agent comes at a cost. 
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As principals set more challenging goals the agent is more likely to fall short of the goal and 
experience a non-monetary loss. It follows that principals who set challenging goals will have to 
raise fixed pay to ensure the participation of the agent. In sum, goal setting generates a tradeoff 
between lowering performance-based incentives and increasing fixed pay to ensure agents’ 
participation. 
Corollary 1 sheds light on previous empirical evidence regarding the relative weakness of 
incentives in real-world labor contracts (see Chiappori and Salanié 2000). In particular, we show 
that taking into account non-monetary incentives such as goal setting may be key to understand 
the limited use of monetary incentives in actual labor contracts.  
An essential feature of the optimal contract is that the decrease in performance pay (monetary 
incentives) made possible by the use of wage-irrelevant goals (non-monetary incentives) more 
than compensates the necessary increase in fixed pay. This leads to a decrease in the principal’s 
agency costs of motivating agents without decreasing the (monetary and non-monetary) incentives 
of the agent to exert effort. It follows that agents will exert more effort and principals will obtain 
higher earnings when goal setting is possible than when it is not (𝑔 = 0). We summarize these 
findings in our second corollary. 
Corollary 2 (Goal setting minimizes agency costs) Goal setting allows the principal to induce 
agents to exert high effort with a lower wage bill.  
The main implications of our model will be tested in a controlled workplace environment 
which is described in the next section.  
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN & CONJECTURES 
3.1. Virtual Workplace with Real Effort and Real Leisure 
We develop a framework in which subjects can undertake a real-effort task while having access 
to a real-leisure alternative (browsing the Internet) at any point in time during the experiment. The 
idea is to consider a laboratory environment in which on-the-job shirking is commonly observed 
so as to be able to uncover incentives effects (Corgnet et al. 2015d). The laboratory setting allows 
the experimenter to control for possible confounding factors commonly encountered in the field 
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such as organizational hierarchies or implicit incentives thus facilitating the detection of incentives 
effects.4 
3.1.1. Organizational Roles 
We consider two types of subjects referred to as B (agent) and C (principal). At the beginning 
of each of the 6 periods, subjects were randomly assigned to one of these two roles. As a result, 
subjects could either be an agent or a principal depending on the period.5 Each agent was randomly 
matched with a single principal. During a period, agents could dedicate their time to either 
completing the work task or browsing the web while principals could only browse the Internet. 
3.1.2. The Work Task 
We consider a real-effort summation task that is particularly long, laborious and effortful (e.g. 
Dohmen and Falk, 2011; Eriksson et al. 2009; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). Subjects would 
sum up matrices of 36 numbers comprised between 0 and 3 for one hour, divided into 10-minute 
periods. Each table completed correctly generated a 40-cent profit while a penalty of 20 cents was 
subtracted from individual production for each incorrect answer.6 We define production as the 
monetary amount generated by a subject’s answers on the work task. 
Subjects were not allowed to use a pen, scratch paper or calculator. This rule amplified the 
level of effort subjects had to exert in order to complete tables correctly. An example of the work 
task is shown in Figure 1. 
 
FIGURE 1.- Example of table summation for the work task. 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 In our lab setting, agents only face explicit incentives.  
5 In a similar environment, Corgnet et al. (2015a) find that fixing subjects’ roles for the whole experiment instead of 
randomizing roles each period does not significantly affect behavior. 
6 Penalties did not apply when individual production was equal to zero so that individual production could not be 
negative. 
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3.1.3. Internet Browsing 
At any point during the experiment, agents could switch from the work task to the leisure 
activity that consisted of browsing the Internet. Each activity was undertaken separately, in a 
different screen so that subjects could not sum tables while being on the Internet. Subjects were 
informed that their use of the Internet was strictly confidential. Subjects were free to consult their 
email or visit any web page.7 The Internet browser was embedded in the software so that the 
experimenter could keep record of the exact amount of time subjects spent on each activity.8  
3.1.4. Contracts 
At the beginning of each period, principals received an initial endowment of 200 cents. Then, 
principals proposed a linear contract (𝛼, 𝛽) to the agent by offering a non-negative fixed pay, 𝛼 ∈
[0,200], as well as a performance pay, 𝛽 ∈ [0,1], representing the share of the work output 
assigned to the agent. In line with the limited liability assumption in our theoretical framework, 
the principal could not “sell the firm” to the agent by proposing a negative fixed pay. 
In addition to setting monetary incentives principals could set a goal to the agent (in the goal 
setting treatment). The goal was stated in terms of the production (in cents) of the agent. We 
informed participants that producing more or less than the goal neither generated rewards nor 
induced penalties to the agent. The principal could decide not to set a goal in which case the label 
“no goal” would appear on the screen.  
After receiving the principal’s offer (fixed pay, performance pay and production goal), the 
agent had to decide whether to accept it or to reject it. In case of acceptance, the agent would be 
rewarded according to the agreed-upon contract. The agent would then be able to work on the task 
or browse the Internet for leisure purposes. In case of rejection, the agent would only be able to 
browse the web for a fixed payment of 150¢ and the principal would keep his or her initial 
endowment of 200¢. The earnings for the agent and the principal are described in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 Subjects were expected to follow the norms set by the university regarding the use of Internet on campus. 
8 The lab policy is to forbid cell phone use inside the lab. This ensures that embedded internet browsing is an accurate 
measure of on-the-job leisure. 
11 
 
TABLE 1. Agents’ and principals’ earnings per period (in cents). 
Agents’ decision Agents’ earnings Principals’ earnings 
Offer accepted 𝛼 + 𝛽(Agent production) 
(200 − 𝛼) + (1 − 𝛽)(Agent 
production) 
Offer rejected 150 200 
(𝛼, 𝛽) represents the principal’s offer, where 𝛼 ∈ [0,200] and 𝛽 ∈ [0,1] 
3.2. Treatments and Procedures 
We conducted two treatments (see Table 2). In the baseline treatment, principals offered a 
linear contract (fixed pay and performance pay) to the agent. In the goal setting treatment principals 
could set a wage-irrelevant goal to the agent in addition to monetary incentives. 
TABLE 2. Summary of the treatments. 
Treatment Description 
Number of participants 
(observations) [sessions] 
Baseline Principals propose a linear contract to the agent. 54 (162) [5] 
Goal Setting 
Principals propose a linear contract and a wage-
irrelevant goal to the agent. 
56 (168) [5] 
 
Our subject pool consisted of students from a major U.S. University. We recruited people who 
previously participated in related studies (Corgnet and Hernan-Gonzalez, 2015; Corgnet et al. 
2015c) so as to ensure that they had experience in completing the work task used in this 
experiment. This was done so that subjects could accurately assess their skills on the task and 
better understand the consequences of each possible contract. We conducted a total of 10 sessions 
with ten or twelve subjects each for a total of 110 subjects (54 were assigned to the baseline and 
56 were assigned to the goal setting treatment).9 
The experiment was computerized and all of the interaction was anonymous. The instructions 
were displayed on subjects’ computer screens (see Appendix B). Subjects had exactly 20 minutes 
to read the instructions. A 20-minute timer was shown on the laboratory screen. Three minutes 
before the end of the instructions period, a monitor announced the time remaining and handed out 
a printed copy of the summary of the instructions. None of the subjects asked for extra time to read 
the instructions. At the end of the 20-minute instruction round, the instructions file was closed, 
                                                          
9 Out of the ten sessions, five were conducted with ten people and five were conducted with twelve. 
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and the experiment started. The interaction between the experimenter and the subjects was 
negligible. 
At the end of the experiment and before payments were made, we elicited subjects social 
preferences (see online Appendix O.1) and asked them to report their math skills on a scale from 
1 to 7. These questionnaires lasted ten minutes. 
Subjects were paid their earnings in cash at the end of the experiment. Individual earnings were 
computed as the sum of the earnings in the 6 periods. Subjects earned on average $31.6 in addition 
to a $7 show-up fee. Experimental sessions lasted on average two hours. 
3.3. Testable Conjectures 
The aim of our experiment is not to test the point predictions derived from the model introduced 
in Section 2. Instead, we aim at assessing the main implications of our theoretical framework 
regarding the relation between monetary incentives (𝛼, 𝛽) and non-monetary incentives (𝑔). 
Based on our previous analysis, we state two conjectures that can be readily tested. Our first 
hypothesis states how goal setting affects the optimal labor contract. 
Hypothesis 1: Goal Setting and Labor Contracts [based on Corollary 1] 
We expect fixed pay to be greater and performance pay to be lower in the presence of 
goal setting than in its absence. 
Note that Hypothesis 1 is a particular case of Corollary 1, which shows that higher goals 
increase fixed pay while decreasing performance pay. In our experiment we will consider two 
treatments: one in which goal setting is made available to the principal and one in which it is not 
(baseline). Therefore, we expect weaker monetary incentives with goal setting (𝑔∗ > 0) than in 
its absence (𝑔 = 0). 
According to Corollary 2, the agency costs of inducing high effort are lower if the principal 
can combine monetary incentives with goal setting. Thus, we expect effort and production to be, 
on average, higher under goal setting than in the baseline. From Corollary 2 we also expect that 
the cost of inducing effort decreases with goal setting which will lead principals to earn 
significantly more in the presence of goal setting than in its absence. We thus derive the following 
hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 2: Production, Effort and Principals’ Earnings [based on Corollary 2] 
i) We expect production levels and work effort to be greater in the presence of goal 
setting than in its absence.  
ii) We also expect principals’ earnings to be greater in the presence of goal setting 
than in its absence. 
 
4. RESULTS 
We start the results section by comparing principals’ offers across treatments. We then study 
contract acceptance, effort and production levels. In our analysis, we use linear and probit panel 
regressions with random effects and robust standard errors.10 
4.1. Contract Design (Hypothesis 1) 
Contracts are largely consistent with Hypothesis 1 according to which principals should offer 
weaker incentives when goal setting is present than when it is absent (see Table 3). For example, 
considering accepted offers, performance pay was lower in the presence of goal setting, 41.5%, 
that in its absence, 45.1%, while fixed pay was larger in the goal setting treatment, 104.9¢, than in 
the baseline, 98.7¢. These differences are statistically significant as is shown in Table 3 where we 
report the p-value associated to the Goal Setting Dummy (which takes value 1 if a subject was 
involved in the goal setting treatment, and 0 otherwise) when conducting panel regressions using 
either fixed pay or performance pay as dependent variable. For the sake of completeness, we report 
the results of regressions using both accepted offers as well as all offers. However, it should be 
noted that considering all offers may not be an adequate test of our theoretical conjectures as 
rejected offers include null offers (𝛼 = 𝛽 = 0) that may bias the analysis.11  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 Results are robust to using other specifications such as Tobit models, non-robust standard errors and wild cluster 
bootstrap standard errors (Cameron and Miller, 2011) as well as OLS regressions with clustered standard errors at the 
session level. These additional analyses are available upon request from the authors. 
11 If we remove extremely low offers from all principals’ offers, the difference in performance pay across treatments 
becomes significant in that case as well. For example, if we remove all those offers for which fixed pay is zero cent 
and performance pay is 0% [less than 5%] (n=3) [n=8] the corresponding p-value becomes 0.092 [0.029]. 
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TABLE 3. Principals’ offers across treatments. 
Average 
(Standard dev.) 
 Baseline 
Goal Setting 
Treatment 
Goal Setting Dummy 
P-value† 
Accepted offers 
Fixed pay 98.7¢ 
(28.7¢) 
104.9¢ 
(31.0¢) 
0.077 
Performance 
pay 
45.1% 
(13.3%) 
41.5% 
(10.4%) 
0.011 
  [n=123] [n=138]  
All offers 
Fixed pay 90.3¢ 
(34.9¢) 
100.3¢ 
(33.3¢) 
0.003 
Performance 
pay 
42.5% 
(16.9%) 
40.4% 
(11.3%) 
0.150 
  [n=162] [n=168]  
†In this column we report the results of two linear panel regressions with robust standard errors with fixed pay and 
performance pay as dependent variables, and a Goal Setting Dummy (which takes value 1 if a subject was involved in 
the goal setting treatment and value 0 otherwise) as regressor. In particular, we report the p-value associated to the 
coefficient of the Goal Setting Dummy. 
 
It is also worth noting that, in the great majority of the cases (84.5%, 142/168), principals set 
a goal to the agent.12 Principals set an average goal of 306.7¢ (SD = 118.2¢) (see Histogram C1 in 
Appendix C). 
4.2. Contract Acceptance 
The large majority of offers were accepted by agents in both the baseline (75.9%, 123/162) and 
the goal setting treatment (82.1%, 138/168). In our regression analysis (Table 4), we use as 
dependent variable a dummy (Accepted dummy) that takes value 1 if a given offer is accepted and 
takes value 0 otherwise. We use self-reported math skills as a control for subjects’ ability.13 Not 
surprisingly, agents are more likely to accept the principal’s offer when the fixed pay and the 
performance pay assigned to the agent are high. The treatment variable is never significant, except 
in the case in which we do not control for fixed pay (p-value = 0.05). However, this significance 
                                                          
12 If we consider as setting “no goals” instances in which production goals were set either at very low or at very high 
levels (such as the following five cases in: 2¢, 2¢, 3¢, 10,000¢, and 1,000,000,000¢), then principals set goals in 81.6% 
of the cases. 
13 Our results are robust to introducing other measures of ability. For example, we can measure ability using a dummy 
variable which takes value 1 if a subject has completed his or her first table correctly and value 0 otherwise. Previous 
research has shown a positive and significant relationship between first table performance and ability on the task 
(Corgnet et al. 2015b). Considering a continuous measure such as the amount of time necessary to complete the first 
table correctly also gives similar results. 
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may be reflecting treatment differences in fixed pay as the effect disappears when we control for 
only fixed pay or both, fixed pay and performance pay.14 
TABLE 4. Probit panel regressions for contract acceptance (Accepted Dummy). 
Constant -0.90** 
(0.39) 
-0.62 
(0.45) 
-3.68*** 
(0.78) 
Goal Setting Dummy 0.12 
(0.17) 
0.31* 
(0.16) 
0.14 
(0.19) 
Contract offer    
Fixed pay 0.02*** 
(0.002) 
- 0.02*** 
(0.004) 
Performance pay - 0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
Math skills 0.06 
(0.06) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
0.12 
(0.07) 
Number of observations 324 324 324 
χ² 38.53*** 22.23*** 38.09 
***Significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
4.3. Effort and Production (Hypothesis 2i) 
In the goal setting treatment, agents produced on average 26.7% more than in the baseline 
despite receiving significantly lower performance pay (see Figure 2). The difference in production 
across treatments corresponds to a difference in subjects’ hourly production of $5.2. These results 
are consistent with Hypothesis 2i. 
 
FIGURE 2.- Agents’ average production (in US Dollars) and 
performance pay (for accepted offers) across treatments. 
                                                          
14 The treatment variable is not significant (p-value = 0.11) when we include neither fixed pay nor performance pay 
as controls. 
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We confirm the statistical significance of these differences in Table 5. We find that the Goal 
Setting Dummy is significant whether controlling for fixed pay, performance pay or both. Fixed 
pay does not explain production levels in contrast with gift-exchange experiments in which the 
contract designed by the principal only includes fixed pay (e.g. Fehr et al. 1993). However, 
performance pay relates positively to agents’ production, which stresses that, in line with our 
theoretical framework, monetary incentives continue to be relevant even in the presence of goal 
setting. 
TABLE 5. Linear panel regressions for Production (in US Dollars). 
Constant 160.35** 
(74.46) 
56.83 
(74.01) 
37.94 
(82.82) 
Goal Setting Dummy 93.16*** 
(28.81) 
96.13*** 
(28.54) 
95.66*** 
(28.57) 
Contract offer    
Fixed pay -0.17 
(0.21) 
- 
0.12 
(0.21) 
Performance pay 
- 
1.74*** 
(0.61) 
1.87*** 
(0.62) 
Math skills 33.33** 
(13.43) 
35.32*** 
(13.25) 
35.47*** 
(13.32) 
Number of observations 258 258 258 
R² 0.14 0.16 0.16 
χ² 20.28*** 25.54*** 25.89*** 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
In addition to the increase in production levels, goal setting led to an increase in agents’ effort 
(see Table 6). We assessed effort by computing the number of tables agents completed as well as 
the time agents spent working instead of browsing the web. In the goal setting treatment agents 
completed 27.6% more tables than in the baseline and spent substantially less time browsing the 
web (4.0%) than in the baseline (11.2%). This implies that agents spent close to six minutes less 
per hour browsing the web in the goal setting treatment than in the baseline. These differences are 
statistically significant, as is shown in Table C1 in Appendix C. The increase in agents’ production 
in the goal setting treatment follows not only from an increase in the time agents spent working 
but also from higher productivity levels. To show that, we define productivity as the production 
(in US Dollars) of an agent per minute spent on the task screen. In Table 6, we show that 
productivity was 23.5% higher in the goal setting treatment than in the baseline, and this difference 
is statistically significant (see Table C1 in Appendix C).  
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TABLE 6. Effort and productivity across treatments. 
Average 
(standard deviation) 
Baseline Goal Setting 
Internet use (%) 
11.20% 
(25.29%) 
3.99% 
(15.25%) 
Completed tables 
9.76 
(4.80) 
12.45 
(3.84) 
Productivity 
$0.34 
($0.16) 
$0.42 
($0.15) 
 
In Table C1 in Appendix C, we show that performance pay as well as math skills led agents to 
complete more tables and be more productive. However, performance pay and math skills did not 
affect the time agents spent on the work task. The presence of goal setting is the only variable that 
led agents to spend more time working and less time browsing. These findings seem to indicate 
that the use of goals may help agents perceive the task as more enjoyable leading them to reduce 
their leisure time on the job. This behavior is in line with our theoretical framework which assumes 
that setting goals to agents will generate non-monetary utility. 
4.4. Agency Costs and Principals’ Earnings (Hypothesis 2ii) 
The higher level of production in the goal setting treatment than in the baseline led principals 
to earn significantly more under goal setting. The average hourly earnings for principals were 
17.3% higher in the goal setting treatment, $19.7, compared to the baseline, $16.8 (see Table 7). 
This result confirms Hypothesis 2ii according to which principals can complement monetary 
incentives with non-monetary incentives to reduce agency costs.  
Interestingly, agents’ earnings were also higher in the goal setting treatment than in the baseline 
despite lower performance pay when goals were present (see last column in Table 7). This was the 
case because fixed pay as well as production were significantly higher in the goal setting treatment 
than in the baseline.  
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TABLE 7. Linear panel regressions for earnings. 
 
Principal 
earnings 
All offers 
Principal 
earnings 
Accepted offers 
Agent Earnings 
Accepted offers 
Constant 258.30*** 
(8.04) 
276.44*** 
(9.85) 
23.48 
(39.47) 
Goal Setting Dummy 51.29*** 
(10.97) 
57.55*** 
(12.72) 
42.51*** 
(13.41) 
Performance pay15 
- - 
3.28*** 
(0.47) 
Math skills 
- - 
14.52** 
(6.06) 
Number of observations 330 261 258 
R² 0.06 0.07 0.25 
χ² 21.87*** 20.47*** 57.45*** 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
An important implication of our findings is that weaker monetary incentives are not necessarily 
associated with lower monetary earnings for both agents and principals. Goal setting allows 
principals to boost work performance and profits while still paying more money to the agents. 
 
4.5. Robustness Checks 
 In Appendix O.1, we show the robustness of all our findings when controlling for other-regarding 
preferences in addition to math skills. Social preferences have indeed been shown to be relevant 
in experimental tests of the principal-agent theory. In particular, subjects’ decision to accept or 
reject a contract as well their decision to produce may be affected by other-regarding preferences 
(Keser and Willinger, 2000, 2007; Anderhub et al. 2002). Also, Cabrales et al. (2010) have shown 
that agents are more likely to select contract offers from principals who have social preferences 
which are similar to their own.16  
In Appendix O.2, we turn to the analysis of the effect of individual goals in the goal setting 
treatment. Our objective is to check the soundness of our theoretical framework by showing that 
more challenging goals, whenever attainable, lead agents to increase their production. We also 
                                                          
15 We do not show the regression results that control for fixed pay as the coefficient associated to fixed pay is never 
statistically significant. This also helps avoid collinearity issues which could be induced by using both fixed pay and 
performance pay as controls in the regression. Our results continue to hold when controlling either for fixed pay or 
for both fixed pay and performance pay. 
16 This finding has important implications for organizational research potentially accounting for the observed 
heterogeneity in “corporate cultures” across firms. 
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show that goal setting reduces the dispersion in production levels which tends to cluster around 
the goal. These findings are in line with standard goal setting models (e.g. Wu et al. 2008). 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Using both agency models and experiments, we have shown that principals set weaker 
monetary incentives when they can set wage-irrelevant goals than when they cannot. This is the 
case because principals can reduce agency costs by substituting costly monetary incentives with 
non-monetary incentives. Despite weaker monetary incentives, agents work more in the presence 
of goal setting than in its absence generating higher earnings for principals. 
Our findings contribute to the theory of incentives by showing that non-monetary incentives 
can remain effective even when monetary incentives are widely available. It follows that non-
monetary incentives are not second-best solutions that only gain popularity when monetary 
incentives are costly to implement. Our findings suggest that both monetary and non-monetary 
incentives effectively motivate people. This highlights the importance of studying different types 
of incentives jointly so as to provide effective guidance to practitioners. 
Finally, our analysis constitutes a point of departure for a theory of the firm that uses non-
monetary incentives as a building block to explain why firms consistently rely on weak incentive 
schemes. To that end, one could extend our work by analyzing the interaction between monetary 
and non-monetary incentives in larger and more complex organizations involving, for example, 
multiple-layer hierarchies. 
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APPENDIX A: Theoretical Framework 
The principal’s problem is to maximize profits subject to participation and incentives 
compatibility constrains of each agent type. For the sake of illustration, we assume that ∆𝑦: =
𝑦𝐻 –  𝑦𝐿 = 𝑦𝐿 > 0. This assumption greatly simplifies the analysis but is not key for our results. 
If both types of agents, l and h, exert a positive effort, the expected production is given by 
E(𝑦) = 𝜃(π1𝑦H + (1 − π1)𝑦L) + (1 − 𝜃)π1𝑦L = Δ𝑦(𝜃 + 𝜋1) and the expected compensation is 
given by E(w) = 𝜃(π1wH + (1 − π1)wL) + (1 − 𝜃)(π1wL + (1 − π1)𝛼) = 𝛽𝐸(𝑦) + 𝛼 where 
w𝐻 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑦𝐻 and w𝐿 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑦𝐿. Principal’s profits are given by 𝐸(𝑦) − 𝐸(w) = (1 −
𝛽)𝐸(𝑦) − 𝛼. 
The high-ability agent’s incentive compatibility constraint (ICh) is given by: 
𝜋1[wH + 𝑣(𝑦H − 𝑔)] + (1 −  𝜋1)[wL  +  𝑣(𝑦L − 𝑔)]– 𝑐
≥  𝜋0[wH  +  𝑣(𝑦H − 𝑔)] + (1 − 𝜋0)[wL +  𝑣(𝑦L − 𝑔)] 
and the low ability agent’s incentive compatibility constraint (ICl) is given by: 
𝜋1[wL + 𝑣(yL − 𝑔)] + (1 − 𝜋1)[α +  𝑣(−𝑔)]– 𝑐
≥  𝜋0[wL  +  𝑣(𝑦L − 𝑔)] + (1 − 𝜋0)[α +  𝑣(−𝑔)] 
Thus, if (ICi) is satisfied, agent 𝑖 ∈ {𝑙, ℎ} prefers to exert a positive effort. 
By normalizing to zero the agent’s reservation utility we can define the high-ability agent’s 
participation constraint (PCh) as:  
𝜋1[wH + 𝑣(𝑦H − 𝑔)] + (1 −  𝜋1)[wL  +  𝑣(𝑦L − 𝑔)]– 𝑐 ≥ 0                                                                    
and the low-ability agent’s participation constraint (PCl) as: 
𝜋1[wL + 𝑣(yL − 𝑔)] + (1 −  𝜋1)[α +  𝑣(−𝑔)]– 𝑐 ≥ 0  
If (PCi) is satisfied, agent i is willing to sign the contract with the principal. 
Rearranging terms we can rewrite the incentive compatibility and participation constraints as: 
∆𝜋[𝛽(𝑦𝐻 − 𝑦𝐿) + ∆𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝑔] ≥ 𝑐                                                                                                 (ICh) 
∆𝜋[𝛽𝑦𝐿 + ∆𝑣𝐿0,𝑔] ≥ 𝑐                                     (ICl) 
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𝛼 + 𝜋1[𝛽𝑦𝐻 + 𝑣𝐻,𝑔] + (1 − 𝜋1)[𝛽𝑦𝐿 + 𝑣𝐿,𝑔] ≥ 𝑐                                                                  (PCh) 
𝛼 + 𝜋1[𝛽𝑦𝐿 + 𝑣𝐿,𝑔] + (1 − 𝜋1)𝑣0,𝑔 ≥ 𝑐                                                                                 (PCl) 
A feasible contract is a pair of wages and a goal {α, β, g} that induce positive effort ensuring 
agent’s participation. The optimal contract is the solution of the following problem: 
(P1)                                                     max
{α,β,g}
(1 − 𝛽)𝐸(𝑦) − 𝛼 
                                                    subject to (ICh, ICl, PCh, PCl) 
∎ 
Proof of Proposition 1 
The principal problem (P1) consists in motivating agent’s effort at the lowest monetary cost using 
a linear contract and a wage-irrelevant goal. 
Since PCL implies PCH in equilibrium: 
 𝛼𝑔 = max {𝑐 − 𝜋1[𝛽𝑔∆𝑦 + 𝑣𝐿,𝑔] − (1 − 𝜋1)𝑣0,𝑔, 0}.                                                               (A1) 
Depending on model parameters we have: 
a. ∆𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝑔 > ∆𝑣𝐿0,𝑔  so ICl implies ICh. 
b. ∆𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝑔 ≤ ∆𝑣𝐿0,𝑔  so ICh implies ICl. 
Therefore, in case (a) we have that: 
𝛽𝑔
∗ = max {
1
∆𝑦
[
𝑐
∆𝜋
− ∆𝑣𝐿0,𝑔] , 0}                                                                                                 (A2) 
and by plugging (A2) in (A1) we get:  
𝛼𝑔
∗ = max {−
𝑐𝜋0
∆𝜋
− 𝑣0,𝑔 , 0},                                                                                                     (A3) 
Note that for any α𝑔 > 0, 
𝑑α𝑔
𝑑𝑔
> 0. Moreover, by the properties of 𝑣(∙) we know that 
𝑑2𝑣(𝑦−𝑔)
𝑑𝑔𝑑𝑦
> 0  
iff y>g and 
𝑑2𝑣(𝑦−𝑔)
𝑑𝑔𝑑𝑦
< 0 iff y<g. Therefore, 
𝑑∆𝑣𝐿0,𝑔
𝑑𝑔
< 0 and hence 
𝑑β𝑔
𝑑𝑔
> 0 for any 𝛽𝑔 > 0. This 
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implies that case (a) cannot arise in equilibrium with positive goals, because the principal could 
decrease both α𝑔 and βg by setting a lower goal.  
Therefore, only case (b) can emerge in equilibrium. In this case, 
𝛽𝑔
∗ = max {
1
∆𝑦
[
𝑐
∆𝜋
− ∆𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝑔] , 0}                                                                                                 (A4) 
Moreover, by plugging (A4) in (A1) we get: 
𝛼𝑔
∗ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {−𝑐
𝜋0
∆𝜋
− 𝜋1(∆𝑣𝐿0,𝑔 − ∆𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝑔) − 𝑣0𝑔, 0}                                                                (A5) 
Finally, the principal will set the goal that maximizes profits. Thus, the optimal goal is given by 
(P2)                          𝑔∗ = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑔
(1 − 𝛽𝑔
∗)𝐸(𝑦) − 𝛼𝑔
∗ = argmin
𝑔
𝛼𝑔
∗ + 𝛽𝑔
∗𝐸(𝑦) 
It remains to be proved that 𝑔∗ ∈ (0, 𝑦𝐻) 
We first prove that 𝑔∗ > 0. Let’s assume by contradiction that 𝑔∗ = 0. In this case, 
𝛽0
∗ = max {
1
∆𝑦
[
𝑐
∆𝜋
− ∆𝑣𝐻𝐿,0] , 0} 
And 𝛼0
∗ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {−𝑐
𝜋0
∆𝜋
− 𝜋1(∆𝑣𝐿0,𝑔 − ∆𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝑔), 0} = 0 
Let’s consider a goal 𝑔 = 𝜀, where 𝜀 > 0 is sufficiently small so that 𝛼𝜀=0. In this case, 
𝛽𝜀
∗ = max {
1
∆𝑦
[
𝑐
∆𝜋
− ∆𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝜀] , 0} 
Since, by property (v) of 𝑣(∙) we know that ∆𝑣𝐻𝐿,0 < ∆𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝜀, this implies that for any positive 
performance pay, 𝛽𝜀
∗ < 𝛽0
∗, and hence 𝑔 yields greater profits than 𝑔∗ = 0. 
To prove that 𝑔∗ < 𝑦𝐻 note that if 𝑔 ≥ 𝑦𝐻 then ∆𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝑔 < ∆𝑣𝐿0,𝑔 and as we proved above (case a) 
the principal would be better off setting a lower goal. 
∎ 
Proof of Corollary 1 
By property (iii) of 𝑣(∙) we know that 𝑣0𝑔 = −𝜆𝑣(𝑔). Therefore, we can rewrite equation (A5) as 
𝛼𝑔
∗ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {−𝑐
𝜋0
∆𝜋
− 𝜋1(∆𝑣𝐿0,𝑔 − ∆𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝑔) + 𝜆𝑣(𝑔),0} 
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Therefore, 𝛼𝑔
∗ > 0 iff 𝜆 >
−𝑐
𝜋0
∆𝜋
−𝜋1(∆𝑣𝐿0,𝑔−∆𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝑔)
𝑣(𝑔)
> 0. Note also that given that 𝑔∗ > 0 there is 
always a sufficiently high 𝜆 so that 𝛼𝑔∗
∗ > 0. 
If 𝛼𝑔
∗ > 0, the optimal goal is the solution of the problem (P2). The first order condition of this 
problem is: 
−
𝑑𝛽𝑔
∗
𝑑𝑔
𝐸(𝑦) −
𝑑𝛼𝑔
∗
𝑑𝑔
= 0                                                                                                                (A6) 
Therefore, 
𝑑𝛽𝑔
∗
𝑑𝑔
 and 
𝑑𝛼𝑔
∗
𝑑𝑔
 must have opposite signs. 
Deriving both sides of equation (A1) with respect to g, we get that: 
−
𝑑𝛼𝑔
∗
𝑑𝑔
= −𝜋1 [
𝑑𝛽𝑔
∗
𝑑𝑔
𝑦𝐿 +
𝑑𝑣𝐿,𝑔
𝑑𝑔
] − (1 − 𝜋1)
𝑑𝑣0,𝑔
𝑑𝑔
                                                                          (A7) 
Thus, by plugging equation (A7) in equation (A6) we get: 
𝑑𝛽𝑔
∗
𝑑𝑔
=
𝜋1
𝑑𝑣𝐿,𝑔
𝑑𝑔 + (1 − 𝜋1)
𝑑𝑣0,𝑔
𝑑𝑔
𝐸[𝑦] − 𝜋1𝑦𝐿
 
Note that since 
𝑑𝑣𝐿,𝑔
𝑑𝑔
 and 
𝑑𝑣0,𝑔
𝑑𝑔
 are both negative (see properties of function 𝑣(∙) in the main text), 
the numerator of this expression is negative. Moreover, since E(y) = 𝜃(π1𝑦H + (1 − π1)𝑦L) +
(1 − 𝜃)π1yL, the denominator is positive for any 𝜃 > 0. Therefore, 
𝑑𝛽𝑔
∗
𝑑𝑔
< 0 and by equation (A6), 
𝑑𝛼𝑔
∗
𝑑𝑔
> 0. 
Finally, it is possible that 𝛼𝑔
∗ = 0, if 𝜆 ≤
−𝑐
𝜋0
∆𝜋
−𝜋1(∆𝑣𝐿0,𝑔−∆𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝑔)
𝑣(𝑔)
, and/or 𝛽𝑔
∗ = 0, if ∆v𝐻𝐿,𝑔 >
𝑐
∆𝜋
 , so 
the result follows. 
∎ 
Proof of Corollary 2 
It follows directly from Proposition 1.    
∎ 
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APPENDIX B: Instructions 
 
Click here 
Link: https://goo.gl/Smg9M8 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
FIGURE C1.- Histogram of goals set by principals (in cents). 
 
 
TABLE C1. Linear panel regressions for effort and productivity. 
 Internet use (%) Tables completed Productivity 
Constant 13.59* 
(7.41) 
3.75** 
(1.76) 
0.08 
(0.07) 
Goal Setting Dummy -9.37** 
(4.06) 
3.18*** 
(0.76) 
0.08*** 
(0.03) 
Performance pay -0.09 
(0.09) 
0.04*** 
(0.02) 
0.001*** 
(0.001) 
Math skills 0.78 
(1.28) 
0.72** 
(0.31) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
Number of observations 258 258 254 
R² 0.04 0.16 0.18 
χ² 6.29* 29.53*** 27.85*** 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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20%
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30%
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APPENDIX O.1 (For Online Publication)  
Social preferences 
We elicited social preferences à la Bartling et al. (2009) by asking subjects to make four choices 
between two possible allocations of money between themselves and another anonymous subject 
with whom they were randomly matched. The allocation decisions are described in Table O1. 
Option A always yielded an even distribution of money ($2 to the self and the other subject). 
Option B yielded uneven payoffs: ($2, $1), (3$, $1), (2$, $4), and (3$, $5) in Games 1, 2, 3 and 4, 
respectively. We classify subjects following Bartling et al. (2009) into four social preferences 
categories as is described in the last column of the table. Prosocial types prefer equal distributions 
of income even when they have the possibility to earn more than the other subjects, as is the case 
in Game 2. Envy types dislike earning less than the other subject and choose Option A in the last 
two games even if it implies a lower payoff to themselves (Game 4). 
Following the authors, we finally characterize subjects as either ahead (behind) averse if they 
were both prosocial and costly prosocial (envious and costly envious). Egalitarian subjects are 
defined as being both ahead and behind averse. 
TABLE O1. Social preferences elicitation (Bartling et al. 2009). 
Game 
Option A 
Payoff self, Payoff other 
Option B 
Payoff self, Payoff 
other 
Social preferences 
type if choice is 
Option A 
1 $2,$2 $2,$1 Prosociality 
2 $2,$2 $3,$1 Costly Prosociality 
3 $2,$2 $2,$4 Envy 
4 $2,$2 $3,$5 Costly Envy 
 
 
In Tables D1, D2, D3 and D4 we replicate the results reported in Tables 4, 5, C1 and 7, 
respectively, controlling for subjects’ social preferences. 
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TABLE O2. Probit panel regressions for the Accepted Dummy  
controlling for social preferences. 
Constant 
-0.89** 
(0.40) 
-0.75 
(0.47) 
-3.67*** 
(0.76) 
Goal Setting Dummy 
0.08 
(0.19) 
0.35** 
(0.16) 
0.13 
(0.19) 
Contract offer    
Fixed pay 
0.02*** 
(0.003) 
- 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
Performance pay - 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
Math skills 
0.06 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
0.11 
(0.07) 
Social preferences    
Ahead averse 
0.47 
(0.29) 
0.30 
(0.36) 
0.43 
(0.27) 
Behind averse 
-0.03 
(0.19) 
0.21 
(0.16) 
0.05 
(0.19) 
Number of observations 324 324 324 
χ² 38.98*** 23.68*** 38.36*** 
***Significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
TABLE O3. Linear panel regressions for Production (in US Dollars) 
controlling for social preferences. 
Constant 
149.40** 
(73.14) 
43.96 
(73.26) 
25.70 
(82.88) 
Goal Setting Dummy 
97.99*** 
(30.71) 
101.43*** 
(30.47) 
100.92*** 
(30.52) 
Contract offer    
Fixed pay 
-0.18 
(0.22) 
- 
0.12 
(0.21) 
Performance pay - 
1.74*** 
(0.62) 
1.87*** 
(0.62) 
Math skills 
32.96** 
(14.05) 
35.00** 
(13.82) 
35.20** 
(13.91) 
Social preferences    
Ahead averse 
-1.57 
(42.71) 
-4.36 
(42.77) 
-5.76 
(43.72) 
Behind averse 
17.60 
(32.43) 
19.08 
(32.12) 
18.68 
(32.15) 
Number of observations 258 258 258 
χ² 21.86*** 26.53*** 26.67*** 
***Significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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TABLE O4. Linear panel regressions for effort and productivity 
controlling for social preferences. 
 Internet use (%) Tables completed Productivity 
Constant 15.01* 
(8.37) 
3.32* 
(1.80) 
0.06 
(0.07) 
Goal Setting Dummy -9.99** 
(4.68) 
3.36*** 
(0.83) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
Contract offer    
Performance pay -0.09 
(0.09) 
0.04*** 
(0.02) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
Math skills 1.09 
(1.34) 
0.72** 
(0.33) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
Social preferences    
Ahead averse -8.92*** 
(2.94) 
-0.50 
(0.96) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
Behind averse -3.46 
(4.77) 
0.59 
(0.87) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
Number of observations 258 258 254 
R² 0.05 0.16 0.18 
χ² 13.30** 29.29*** 29.58*** 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
TABLE O5. Linear panel regressions for earnings controlling for social preferences. 
 
Principal 
earnings 
All offers 
Principal 
earnings 
Accepted offers 
Agent Earnings 
Accepted offers 
Constant 255.44*** 
(12.31) 
270.50*** 
(15.09) 
15.02 
(39.18) 
Goal Setting Dummy 52.57*** 
(11.41) 
59.03*** 
(13.62) 
45.98*** 
(14.07) 
Contract offer    
Performance pay 
- - 
3.29*** 
(0.47) 
Ability measures    
Self-reported skills 
- - 
14.03** 
(6.26) 
Social preferences    
Ahead averse -12.98 
(20.32) 
8.08 
(23.75) 
7.61 
(17.23) 
Behind averse 4.87 
(11.88) 
8.08 
(13.86) 
13.65 
(14.93) 
Number of observations 330 261 258 
R² 0.06 0.07 0.26 
χ² 21.87*** 20.58*** 61.38*** 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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APPENDIX O.2 (For Online Publication)  
On the internal mechanics of the goal setting model 
O.2.1. On the positive effect of challenging but attainable goals 
After assessing the aggregate effect of goals in previous sections, we turn to the analysis of the 
effect of individual goals in the goal setting treatment. Our objective is to deepen our understanding 
of the effect of goals and connect our findings to our theoretical framework. This section thus tests 
the internal mechanics of our model instead of its main conjectures. To understand the effect of 
individual goals, we need to identify those goals which were reasonably accurate in the sense of 
being attainable by agents of a given ability level. To that end, we start by building a measure of 
ability on the task to predict the production level a given participant should be able to complete 
correctly in the work task. We denote this predictor of performance by work task ability. This 
variable is constructed for each participant 𝑖 as follows: 
Work task abilityi = α̂0 + α̂1 × (Self˗reported) Math skills𝑖 
+α̂2 × First table correct𝑖 + α̂3First correct table time𝑖 
where First table correcti is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if subject i completed correctly 
the first attempted table, First correct table timei measures the time subject i spent to complete the 
first correct table, and the coefficients α̂ 0, α̂1, α̂2 and α̂3 are estimated with the following linear 
panel regression using data from the baseline treatment: 
Number of correct tables𝑖𝑡 = α0 + α1 × (Self˗reported) Math skills𝑖 
+α2 × First table correct𝑖 + α3First correct table time𝑖 + ϵ𝑖𝑡 
We obtain α̂ 0 = 253.61 (114.59), α̂ 1 = 27.92 (17.22),  α̂ 2 = 93.97 (49.96) and α̂3 = −1.72 
(0.54) (robust standard errors in brackets), for a regression with R2 = 0.27. The difference 
between agents’ production levels in the baseline and their estimated work task ability was less 
than the value of one (two) [three] correct tables in 28.5% (42.3%) [62.4%] of the cases. 
We define reasonably and non-reasonably accurate goals on the basis of work task ability. 
Reasonably (non-reasonably) accurate goals are defined such that the difference -in absolute 
terms- between the goal set by the principal and the estimated work task ability of the agent is less 
(more) than the value of two tables. Using this criterion, 29.7% of the goals in the goal setting 
treatment are classified as reasonably accurate. We also report similar results using either a wider 
(+/-3 tables, 46.4% of reasonably accurate goals) or a narrower range (+/- 1 table, 13.8% of 
reasonably accurate goals) for the definition of reasonably accurate goals. The difference between 
an agent’s maximum and minimum levels of production in the baseline treatment was on average 
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equal to 3.3 tables indicating that, on average, a goal which is within +/-2 or +/-3 tables of work 
task ability is likely to correspond to a normal range of values of production for a given participant. 
We show that the interaction term between the value of the goal and the reasonable goal dummy 
is positive and significant meaning that making a goal more challenging, while still being 
reasonable, has a positive effect on agents’ production. This shows that the effect of the goal setting 
treatment on production directly lies on the selection of goals in line with our theoretical model. 
TABLE O6. Linear panel regressions for production as a function of goals 
(Goal setting treatment). 
Goal setting treatment Reasonable goals in: 
 +/-1 table +/-2 tables +/-3 tables 
Constant 338.81*** 
(55.48) 
344.01*** 
(57.29) 
336.33*** 
(54.42) 
Goal Value (ȼ) -0.03 
(0.07) 
-0.04 
(0.08) 
-0.05 
(0.08) 
Reasonable Goal Dummy† 
 
-127.44** 
(63.49) 
-134.50*** 
(46.25) 
-71.86* 
(37.68) 
Reasonable Goal Dummy×Goal Value (ȼ) 
 
0.40* 
(0.22) 
0.39*** 
(0.14) 
0.20* 
(0.11) 
Contract offer    
Performance pay 1.64* 
(0.97) 
1.66* 
(1.02) 
1.84* 
(0.98) 
Number of observations 138 138 138 
R² 0.04 0.06 0.05 
χ² 12.66** 14.99*** 9.72** 
†The reasonable goal dummy takes value 1 if goal is defined as reasonable according to the given definition (+/-1 
table, +/-2 tables or +/- 3 tables). 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
O.2.2. On the “piling-up” effect of goal setting 
In Figure E1 we show the cumulative distribution function for production on the work task. We 
observe that production levels are more concentrated in the goal setting treatment than in the 
baseline. The standard deviation of production and the coefficient of variation are significantly 
lower in the goal setting treatment (SD = 148.4, CV = 0.36) than in the baseline (SD = 179.2, CV 
= 0.55) (F(122,114)= 1.46, p-value=0.04). This result is consistent with previous goal setting 
theoretical works (e.g. Wu et al. 2008, Section 4, pages 15-19) finding that production “piles up” 
around the goal implying that goal setting decreases the dispersion in production. 
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Figure O1. Cumulative distribution functions for production by treatment. 
 
Figure O1 also shows that the difference in production across treatments is particularly large for 
low production levels. A significant proportion of agents (21.1%) produced less than 200¢ per 
period in the baseline, whereas these low levels of production are almost non-existent in the goal 
setting treatment (2.9%, Proportion test, p-value <0.01). Thus, goal setting seems to be especially 
effective motivating agents who would have produced very little in an environment with only 
monetary incentives. 
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